Abstract This paper jointly designs the level of external control that financial claimants have; characterized as likelihood of performance-based CEO dismissals, and the internal organization of firms. While the internal organization of a firm affects competition between lower-level managers to become the CEO, performancebased CEO dismissal and replacement alters the incentives due to this competition. I show that CEO dismissals are likely to be accompanied by an outside replacement or firm liquidation and such governance mechanisms reduce the counterproductive activities that arise due to managerial competition ('power struggles'). This enables the CEO to increase managerial competition by directly accessing more managers and benefit from more information. However, strong governance may also reduce managerial incentives to acquire skill to become the CEO. This potential cost reduces as better information provides the CEO a higher bargaining power and hence a higher reward to the managers on becoming the CEO. I argue that developments in information technology -by increasing the amount of information that lower-level managers can acquire -has increased the benefits and lowered the costs of strong governance mechanisms, leading to three documented trends: (1) increases in shareholder-induced CEO turnover, (2) increases in the number of positions reporting directly to the CEO (i.e. flatter firms) and (3) higher pay inequality between CEO and lower-level managers. Several empirical implications are derived from the model and its extensions.
Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical link between the external control that financial claimants have and how organizations are structured. Specifically, I provide a framework to jointly design the strength of firm-level corporate governance and the internal organization of firms.
The framework simultaneously sheds light on three documented trends over the last two decades.
First, shareholder activism has increased causing greater CEO dismissals and greater cases of outside replacements for the CEO. The hostile takeover wave of the eighties triggered changes in the previously weak corporate governance environment.
1
In the 90's however, shareholder activism has been characterized by large institutions, such as TIAA-CREF and CALPERS.
2
Irrespective of the specific form of governance, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) dismissals have steadily increased (Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) ). Further, not only is CEO turnover higher but instances of forced turnover and outside succession have increased as well.
3
Khurana and Sonnenfield note that 'among the top 200 firms, 50% of CEOs are 1 Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) note that before the 80's "the external governance mechanisms available to dissatisfied shareholders were seldom used. Raiders and hostile takeovers were relatively uncommon. Proxy fights were rare and didn't have much chance of succeeding. And corporate boards tended to be cozy with and dominated by management, making board oversight weak."
2 For example, Gompers and Metrick (2001) report that from 1980 to 1996, large institutional investors nearly doubled their share of ownership of U.S. corporations from less than 30% to more than 50%. For a detailed discussion on the changes over the last 20 years, see Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) and Kaplan (1997) .
3 The cover story in business week ('The CEO Trap ', 11 December 2000) reported that two-thirds of major companies worldwide have replaced their CEO at least once since 1995 and more than 1000 U.S CEOs have left office in 2000.
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More executives now directly report to the CEO and there are fewer levels between the CEO and the lower-level managers (Rajan and Wulf (2003) ). To remain consistent with the terminology in Rajan and Wulf (2003) , I term this the 'flattening' of firms. Using a detailed database of job descriptions and compensation data for 300 large US firms, Rajan and Wulf find that the median number of managers reporting directly to the CEO has increased from 4 in 1986 to 7 in 1999. Over the same period they also find that the depth, defined as the number of levels between the CEO and the division head, has reduced by 25%.
An accompanying third trend is the increasing pay inequality in top management teams. Rajan and Wulf (2003) report that the ratio of CEO pay (salary plus bonus) to the next level manager's pay (salary plus bonus) has increased from 2.8 to 4.56.
5
In addition to this positive motivation, the paper has a normative point as well. The strength of corporate governance mechanisms affects CEO succession and hence alters the incentives of managers inside the firm who expect to gain power by becoming the CEO. How these incentives are affected depend not only on the strength of governance mechanisms but also on the internal organization of the firm. It is precisely this link that the paper emphasizes by undertaking a joint design of firm-level corporate governance and the internal organization of firms.
In the framework presented, the role of internal organization is to set up rules that determine the access of each manager to the firm's physical and human resources Zingales (1998, 2001) ). Specifically, I focus on the access that firm managers have to headquarters.
6
This plays two roles.
4 'Manager's Journal : Fishing for CEO's in your own backyard', Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2002. They also note that one-third of the exits were due to dismissal.
5 The pay inequality rises further if one accounts for other forms of compensation; from 3.37 in 1986 to 6.81 in 1999. Median long-term incentive pay for divisional managers as a fraction of their salary and bonus goes up from 0.32 to 0.58. For CEOs, median long-term incentive pay goes up from 0.59 to 1.36. For further description see Rajan and Wulf (2003) .
6 I use access to headquarters interchangeably with access to the CEO. This captures access to the various aspects that allow skill acquisition by the division manager such as witnessing important firm decision Corporate Governance and Internal Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 First, greater access to headquarters allows managers to accumulate skills that are required to be the CEO and to be observed by the incumbent CEO. If later selected as CEO, the acquired skill gives them power to bargain with the shareholders (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . However, the selection process involves intrafirm managerial competition that leads to both productive and counterproductive activities. To convey the central message clearly, the paper focuses on the counterproductive activities and internal conflict that I term managerial 'power struggles'.
8
Categories of these counterproductive activities include influencing the incumbent CEO's decision by lobbying or 'sucking up', spending too much time on activities observable by the CEO, spending too much time on skill generating activities, noncooperation with other CEO candidates, lying to the CEO or even sabotage.
9
Second, greater distance between the CEO and the managers also reduces the CEO's ability to extract information from the managers.
10
Thus, a CEO's ability to receive information from the lower levels of the organization are affected by the internal organization (Simon, 1957) . A tall and narrow hierarchical structure makes it difficult for the CEO to receive information from the bottom levels, whereas a flat and wide design enables the CEO to receive information from all agents.
11
As an example consider, General Electrics recent making, more chances to learn the CEO's management style, a chance to interact with the board of directors etc.
7 When the CEO of GE, Jack Welch announced that he would delay naming his successor for another 6 months, Wall Street Journal carried an article on the concerns of internal conflict due to this delay (23 October 2000) . The share price dropped by 4.6% as well.
8 As we will see later in section 3B and 5.1, considering the productive activities only strengthens the results.
9 Prior literature has termed such activities rent seeking (Holmstrom, 1982) , influence activities (Milgrom, 1988 and Milgrom and Roberts, 1988) , noncooperation and sabotage (Lazear, 1989) etc. The idea that nonproductive activities arise due to the presence of a centralized authority was articulated by Krueger(1974) and Bhagwati(1982) in the context of public institutions. Empirical evidence in support of sabotage and noncooperation has been recently documented by Garicano(2000) in a sports environment.
10 The amount of information that is lost due to lower access is likely to be related to the 'softness' of the information (Petersen, 2001) . As seen later, I use this distinction to generate empirical implications. Further, arguments that suggest that greater number of hierarchical levels increase the amount of information that the CEO receives are less likely to apply in cases when information is soft as well (Novaes and Zingales, 2003) .
11 There might be greater costs to processing greater information (Simon, 1957) . I abstract from these costs. The vertical structure analyzed in the paper should be viewed as vertical relative to the information Corporate Governance and Internal Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 decision to break-up GE Capital into four business units. The former chairman of GE Capital, who reported directly to the CEO, left the firm and the four business unit heads started reporting directly to the CEO. Jeffrey Immelt, the CEO of GE, explained the decision thus:
"the reason for doing this is simple -I want more contact with the financial services teams."
12
To sum then, the internal organization of the firm not only affects the amount of time and effort that managers spend on counterproductive activities but also affects the information that the CEO receives. The amount of counterproductive activities are affected by the number of managers with access to the CEO (CEO candidates) and the amount of information that the CEO can extract from the managers is affected by the CEO's access to the managers.
The aspect of strong governance I emphasize in the paper is performance based CEO dismissals. The threat of CEO dismissal and possible replacement alters the incentives of managers inside the firm who expect to gain power by becoming the CEO. If such dismissals also increase the likelihood of an outsider replacement, managerial incentives to indulge in counterproductive activities reduce. Expending effort in these counterproductive activities only increases the probability of an outsider replacing the incumbent CEO, reducing each manager's chances of gaining power. This reduction in counterproductive activities now enables the CEO to flatten the firm without the fear of managerial power struggles. The increased information from the lower-level managers also allows the CEO to use his skill more and hence enjoy greater bargaining power. This leads to a greater pay inequality between the CEO and the managers.
Strong corporate governance mechanisms are also associated with costs. As the chances of outsider replacement increase, managerial incentives to acquire the necessary skill may be weakened as well. In general, the incentives to acquire skill depend on two factorsthe chance of gaining power and the reward (the pay inequality). In addition to corporate efficient structure that takes into account all informational frictions. See, e.g. Keren and Levhari (1983) .
12 G.E. Is Breaking Its Largest Unit Into Four Parts, NY Times, July 27, 2002.
governance, the internal organization of the firm also affects these factors. Optimal corporate governance weighs the benefits of lower counterproductive activities with the costs of lower incentives to acquire skill to determine the strength of these CEO dismissal mechanisms.
I analyze the conditions when optimal corporate governance is associated with firm level restructuring by jointly designing internal organization and corporate governance.
An extension of the framework presents a novel interaction between homogeneity in industries and governance that I term the 'contagion effect' of corporate governance. The presence of strong governance increases the number of interfirm transfers at the top management level. This reduces each manager's incentives to indulge in intra-firm power struggle activities, enabling a larger number of firms to be flat. Therefore the presence of good governance in even a few firms can enable the other firms in the industry to benefit from it.
Finally, I endogenize the choice of CEO replacement by discussing why using an outsider replacement is more desirable than an insider replacement in forced CEO dismissals.
There are four contributions of this paper. First, the paper makes a simple yet fundamental point -the presence of strong shareholders enables the empowerment of more managers inside the firm.
13
This simple point explains the three trends that have characterized the last two decades and is in contrast to most of the literature in finance where governance design is unrelated to the internal design of the firm.
14 Conversely, it also adds to the vast literature in the design of hierarchies by noting the role of external shareholders. This role is shown within a strand of the internal organization literature that emphasizes the role of hierarchies in allocating access to firm resources. (Rajan and Zingales (2001) ).
15
13 The result, though derived differently, is similar in spirit to Mueller and Warneryd(2001) who use outsider ownership, to reduce the free rider problem and reduce the losses associated with internal conflict. Further, Mueller and Warneryd (2001) focus on inside versus outside ownership and abstract from internal organization and governance induced dismissals.
14 Garicano(2000) , providing a technology based explanation for the changes in hierarchy and pay inequality, notes that a shortcoming of the incentive approach to organizations is that hierarchical forms were assumed rather than derived.
15 There are four general categories the literature on internal organization can be grouped into. A first one deals with information processing, where agents in hierarchies are information processors (Radner, 1992, Second, the paper designs corporate governance optimally, even when there exists no exogenous costs of governance. The benefits (reduction in counterproductive activities by managers) and the costs (reduction in managerial skill acquisition) are derived from the framework. This is in contrast to much of the literature that has emphasized the benefits, often exogenous, of corporate governance.
16
Third, the paper adds to the literature on the theory of the firm. Milgrom (1988) suggested that the reason not all production activity is carried out in one firm is the presence of 'influence costs' that arise due to counterproductive activities by those subject to central authority. If this is true, the paper suggests that the presence of governance will not only makes firms flatter but also bigger.
17
Finally, the paper provides insights on where one might observe higher pay inequality at the top management level even when the CEO has no agency costs. It emphasizes that aspects such as internal organization and corporate governance shape the CEO pay and should be considered in the debate over excessive CEO compensation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the basic framework. Section 3 characterizes the benefits of corporate governance. Section 4 proceeds to derive the costs of governance and design the optimal strength of corporate governance.
Discussion and Extensions are undertaken in Section 5. Section 6 uses the framework to shed light on the three aforementioned trends that have characterized the US economy over the last two decades and presents new empirical implications. The conclusion follows. Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994) or resource allocators (Cremer, 1980 and Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1991) . A second one focuses on monitoring as the main role of managers (Calvo and Weillisz, 1978 and Qian, 1994) . A third strand (Rajan and Zingales, 2001 ) studies the role of hierarchies in administering access to core resources. Finally, Garicano (2000) studies the role of hierarchies in knowledge acquisition.
16 An exception is Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) where the costs of governance endogenously arise due to the reduced authority of the CEO.
17 The spate of large scale mergers might be indicative of these changes.
Consider a firm in an overlapping generations model, where each agent in the economy has a productive life for two periods.
18
At the beginning of each period, the shareholders hire a CEO and two young managers (M1 and M2) to execute a project. After acquiring skill (as a manager) in the first period, an agent can become the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
19
Therefore, at the beginning of each period, the CEO lives for one period whereas the managers live for two periods. At time t (today), the shareholders design the strength of corporate governance mechanisms while the CEO designs the internal organization (hierarchy of access to headquarters).
20

A. Sequence Of Events Each Period
The sequence of events in each period is shown in figure 1 . At the beginning of each period the CEO bargains with the shareholders over future surplus and signs sharing contracts.
21
I use Nash bargaining as the solution concept for the bargaining game. The managers who are given access to headquarters choose to acquire skill, σ, and choose the level of effort in counterproductive activities, n. Managers then transmit their information through the hierarchical levels to the CEO, who takes an action to affect the success probability of the project. Shareholders observe this probability and contingent on the strength of the governance mechanisms in place, may dismiss the incumbent CEO to choose an outside rival.
The final cash flows are realized at the end of the period.
B. Project and Information
The project yields a terminal cash flow X if it succeeds or 0 if it fails. The CEO's action determines the probability of success. Relevant information for the action is transferred from the manager to the CEO through the organization and the CEO uses his skill to make the decision based on this information.
Managers have information with probability g(c, n i ), where i denotes the managers, c denotes the cost of acquiring information and n denotes the time and effort in counterproductive activities.
22
The following assumptions are made about the properties of g(c, n).
The assumptions together state that managers are less likely to be informed as the cost of acquiring information increases and as they spend more time and resources in nonproductive power struggles. For some figures and propositions, I use as an example, the functional form,
, where ι 0 represents the base level information acquired and is a function of the costs of acquiring information.
The internal organization determines the probability with which the CEO is able to access the information that the managers have. The greater the distance between the manager and the CEO the lower the chances that the CEO can obtain the information that the manager has. To capture, I assume that there is no information loss when the CEO has access to both managers but a fraction of the information, L, is lost when the CEO has access to only one manager.
23
I also assume that information from both managers has to be available for decision making.
24
If the CEO receives all the relevant information, he takes an action that increases the probability of success from p L to p L + σ. The probabilities of success 22 When the non productive activity takes the form on noncooperation or sabotage managers' information would be reflected by g(c, n j ). Unless mentioned otherwise, these alternative forms generate same results in the model since I solve for symmetric solution and do not rely on a specific form of the non-productive activity.
23 L can also be viewed as the benefits of increased managerial incentives to work due to flattening, as in Aghion and Tirole (1997) (also see Liberti (2003) Corporate Governance and Internal Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 are observable to all the agents in the economy. The underlying assumption regarding the technology is stated below.
A.2 CEO relies on information from managers to make value increasing decisions.
Hence CEO skill and decision specific information are both valuable and complementary.
The results would be weaker but qualitatively similar if managerial information and CEO skill were substitutes. What is important is that both managerial information and CEO skill have an impact on productivity.
C. Internal Organization
At the initial date, t, the CEO designs internal organization of the firm by setting rules that limit the managers' ability to access headquarters. I consider two possible structuresvertical (V) or flat (F).
25
In a vertical organization, M2 reports to M1 who in turn reports to the CEO. The CEO has no direct access to M2 and conversely, M2 has no direct access to headquarters. In a flat organization, M1 and M2 both report directly to the CEO. Here, both the managers have direct access to headquarters. Figure 2 presents the two alternative structures.
D. Preferences
The CEO and the managers are endowed with a utility function U i = C i + wB, where C is the compensation and B is the amount of private benefits.
26
Although shareholders have ownership, contracts are incomplete and the CEO and the managers enjoy private benefits, B. The private benefits are non transferable. The reservation wage for all agents is R.
27
In the beginning of the period, all managers have a skill level σ = s o . The managers who have access 25 In the framework analyzed decision making is always centralized. The issue is of whether to centralize or decentralize organizational design. An example of where centralization of decision making is questioned can be found in Stein (2003) , among others.
26 Discussion on the use of performance based pay contracts can be found in Section 6. The agents are also assumed to have no personal wealth. 27 The reservation wage for the CEO is arguably higher than that of the manager. Accounting for this only strengthens the results.
to the CEO can further acquire skill, s, at a cost c(s) = 1 2 k s s 2 to enhance their skill level to σ = s o +s. The additional skill acquired can be thought of as firm specific skill and comprises of many different elements all of which cannot be objectively specified.
28
Consequently, whether managers acquire skill can only be observed by the immediate superior and not by the shareholders, leaving room for counterproductive activities. Finally, the private cost due to effort in counterproductive activities is
E. Corporate Governance
After the CEO takes action, a rival appears. The rival lacks firm specific skill and is therefore endowed with skill level σ = s o . However, he might have information relevant for the project from other sources. I assume that once the rival has access to headquarters he takes time to acquire firm specific skill and can only use the acquired skill in the next period.
This ensures that the rival continues as CEO in the next period. In the current period however, under the rival's management the project succeeds with probability (
where q is a function of the information he possesses.
, it is optimal for the shareholders to dismiss the incumbent and hire the rival when the probability of success under the incumbent is observed to be p L . On the other hand if the probability of success
. To ensure that the threat of CEO dismissal is credible when performance is poor and that the CEO continues if he performs well, I assume the following.
A3
.
Since the CEO stands to lose his private benefits due to dismissal, there is a conflict between shareholders and the CEO. If the incumbent CEO has control of the board (Almazan and Suarez, 2003) or there exists a large number of takeover defenses in place, he might be entrenched. On the other hand, if the governance mechanisms are strong and effective, he will be dismissed according to the shareholder's wishes. δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) captures the differences 28 Skill is therefore not contractible.
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Governance And The Basic Tradeoff
This section highlights the basic tradeoff that the incumbent CEO faces between choosing the alternative organization structures. To highlight the tradeoff I initially take the difference between CEO pay and manager pay to be exogenous and equal to ∆ Further I abstract from the costs of strong governance by assuming that the skill level in different organization structures is the the same (σ). These assumptions will be relaxed in the next section to jointly design governance and internal organization. Here, the the focus is on how strong governance can enable the flattening of the firm. Henceforth, without any loss of generality and for the sake of notational brevity, I set p L = 0. I first, consider the tradeoff in the absence of corporate governance (δ = 0) and then, with strong corporate governance (δ = 1).
A. Without Governance (δ=0)
In the absence of any threat of dismissal the CEO enjoys his private benefits in all possible scenarios and continues in office till the end of the period. To select his successor, he chooses among managers who might have acquired necessary skills to be in the CEO position. The number of potential CEO candidates depends on the number of managers who are provided access to headquarters in the beginning of the period. I assume that the CEO's subjective views are formed based on the counterproductive activities only. As mentioned earlier, incorporating productive activities only strengthens the results (see section 3B and 5.1).
In a vertical structure, only manager M1 has access to headquarters. Consequently, the incumbent CEO will choose M1 to succeed him as the CEO. Further, since M1 faces no competition from M2 he does not divert effort in counterproductive activities. Therefore
Corporate Governance and Internal Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 n * V = 0 and the probability with which the manager is informed is given by g(c, n i ) = g(c, 0). In a flat structure, both M1 and M2 have access to headquarters and are potential candidates for the CEO position. Therefore, each manager now spends effort in non-productive activities to increase their chances of promotion. The managers effort in these activities influences the probability, n, with which he is viewed favorably by the CEO. Manager M i chooses n i to maximize
where R = C M + wB is the reservation wage. This assumes that if both managers are viewed favorably or unfavorably they have an equal chance ( 1 2 ) of succeeding the CEO and that if not chosen as the CEO, the managers pursues his outside opportunity. The first order condition for the expression above yields
. Solving for a symmetric equilibrium each manager
in counterproductive activities. Therefore the probability with which each manager is informed is now g(c, n * ) = g(c,
).
The CEO's ability to access the information that the manager's have depends on the internal organization of the firm. In a vertical structure, the CEO receives only part of the information that the managers have due to his limited access to M2. The CEO receives information with probability g(c, n
. In a flat structure, the CEO has access to both the managers and consequently there is no information loss. Therefore the CEO receives information with probability g(c, n *
The tradeoff is now clear. A flat organization increases the CEO's ability to access valuable information but also reduces each manager's information due to the counterproductive activities that they indulge in. The incumbent CEO will choose a flat organization if
The condition is summarized in the following lemma. 
The condition above simply states that firms will be flat when the the loss in information in a vertical firm is greater than the loss in information due to the counterproductive activities. In the absence of strong governance, vertical structures are more likely as CEO pay increases and as costs of indulging in counterproductive activities reduce. Also, vertical structures are more likely to be optimal as losses associated with information transfer reduce. The result above is similar in spirit to the the intuition in Holmstrom (1988) and Tirole (1986) as it suggests that vertical bureaucratic rules can be optimal under some conditions. We now proceed to the case when governance is strong and show how governance reduces the costs associated with flattening the firm.
B. With Governance (δ = 1)
With a strong threat of dismissal, the CEO will now be dismissed if the probability of success under the rival's management is greater than the probability of dismissal under the incumbent's management. Ex ante the incumbent is always preferred since he has firm specific skill that the rival lacks. However ex-post the rival might have information that the incumbent lacks. If governance is strong (δ = 1) and if the incumbent CEO does not take the right action, he will be replaced by the rival (by assumption A.3). Even though only the CEO is dismissed, the replacement also effects the lower-level managers. Once the CEO is replaced with an outsider rival, the managers lose their chance of becoming the CEO.
29
This in turn makes natural succession valuable to the managers and affects their incentives to indulge in counterproductive activities. (1−L). However when the organization is flat, each manager now maximizes
where R = C M + wB is the reservation wage. Note that each manager's counterproductive activities are only useful if the incumbent CEO continues till the end of the period, which in turn depends on the firm performance. The first order condition for a symmetric
] < 1 and hence the optimal level of counterproductive activities is now lower than the level of such activities in the absence of governance.
the optimal level of counterproductive activities is in fact 0. For example the functional form
30
For the remainder of the paper I assume that this condition holds. This enables computation of closed form solutions without reversing any of the qualitative results. The assumption is stated formally below.
Now, the optimal level of counterproductive activities is n * F (δ = 1) = 0 and the probability with which the CEO receives information is now g(c, 0) 2 .
31
Therefore the threat of dismissal reduces the costs associated with flattening the firm and now enables the CEO to 30 Using this functional form, the first order condition is k n n
and hence the optimal level of counterproductive effort is now n * F (δ = 1) = 0 31 A.4 is not sufficient to ensure that the optimal level of counterproductive activities is 0 if (1) the dismissal for poor performance is not certain or (2) the CEO requires information from only one of the managers to take the correct action. Nevertheless, the level of counterproductive activities will always reduce in the presence of strong governance. See appendix for the exact solution form if g(c, n) = ι 0 (1 − n) and the rival appears with probability r.
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g(c,0) 2 , governance induced dismissal causes flattening of the firm. In the presence of strong governance mechanisms, n * (δ = 1) = 0.
The proposition suggests that governance induced restructuring is more likely as counterproductive activities are more likely and as information is easier to transfer. If the difficulty of transferring information is related to the degree of its softness, one would expect to see a larger number of governance-induced restructuring in hard information environments. The value creation due to this flattening comes from the greater information available to the CEO and due to the replacement value. In order to focus on internal organization I consider only the restructuring value. Also note that the value creation due to restructuring arises endogenously from the model while the benefit from replacement is clearly a function of the exogenously specified q.
32
I summarize the value creation in the following proposition.
the value creation due to governance induced dismissal arises from restructuring and is given by
B R = g(c, 0) 2 LσX. For L > 1 − g(c, ∆ F 2k n ) 2 g(c,0) 2 ,
the value creation from governance induced dismissal arises from the reduction in counterproductive activities by the managers and not due to restructuring. The value creation is given by
Proof: See Appendix.
The value creation is higher when the managers are more informed (lower c) and when the actions of the CEO have a higher impact (higher σX). 32 The following proposition can be viewed as the value creation from governance when q = 
Pay inequality and Design of Corporate Governance
Governance induced dismissal, as shown in the previous section, can reduce the counterproductive activities by managers and hence enable the CEO to directly access more managers.
At the core of these counterproductive activities is the fact the CEO gets paid more than the managers by an amount equal to ∆ In the first mechanism, the CEO has bargaining power since he has acquired firm specific skills that outsiders lack and hence is able to get more than his reservation wage. This causes inequality in pay between the CEO and the managers. It is precisely the desire for this power that elicits counterproductive activities from managers. In this section, I use this mechanism to derive the CEO's pay endogenously and hence determine ∆ (G) F . Motivated by the theory on tournaments (Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Rosen (1989) ), an alternative reason for the existence of pay inequality is to incentivize lower-level managers. Therefore, even if shareholders had all the bargaining power and were free to give a contract to the CEO, they would choose to pay him more than the managers. The main results presented in this paper are unchanged even if this alternative mechanism is used for determining CEO pay.
A discussion can be found in section 5. Further, I now allow the skill levels of the managers in the various organizations to be different and denote them by s 
When the firm is flat and governance is weak, the pay inequality is
and finally when the firm is flat and the governance is strong, the pay inequality is
where n *
and n * (δ = 1) = 0, as was shown in section 3.
It is now useful to revisit the previous section using the aforementioned expressions for the pay inequalities. The result in Lemma 1 can now be used to state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the absence of any governance, the firm is more likely to be vertical when the costs of acquiring information are low.
The higher the amount of information that the CEO receives, the greater is the pay inequality. More information enables the CEO to leverage his skill more and hence increase his pay. This increases the pay inequality between the CEO and the managers. In the absence of strong governance mechanisms, increases in pay inequality exacerbate managerial power struggles and the accompanying counterproductive activities. Therefore the vertical structure becomes more attractive as managerial information increases. In vertical firms, lower costs of acquiring information also imply greater informational losses. Therefore, mechanisms that can remove the friction of internal power struggles will now add greater value. Changing the governance mechanisms from weak to strong in such cases will not only create more value but is also more likely to induce restructuring, since the optimal structure in the absence of governance is more likely to vertical. Figure 3 shows how the value creation and the restructuring is a function of the managers' information and the costs of information transmission. A useful observation is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Governance-induced restructuring increases as managerial information increases.
Note that the other factor that increases pay inequality is the skill that the manager's acquire. I now proceed to investigate the effects of governance and internal organization on the incentives of manager's to acquire skill and complete the joint design of internal organization and corporate governance.
Costs and the Optimal Design of Corporate Governance
So far, I have suppressed the costs of corporate governance. Therefore strong governance is always desirable. Firms that were initially flat remain flat with strong governance whereas firms that were vertical reorganize to become flat in the presence of strong governance mechanisms. In both cases value creation is positive since managerial counterproductive activities are reduced. However, as this section shows, there are costs associated with strong governance mechanisms as well. Since strong governance increases the chances of an outsider replacement, insiders in the firm may now have a lower incentive to acquire the skills necessary to be CEO. These costs also depend on the internal organization of the firm and the reward for the managers on becoming the CEO (CEO pay). The benefits of governance now have to be traded off with these potential costs to determine the optimal strength of the governance mechanisms. In this section, I investigate how changes in the information levels In equilibrium the expected payoff to the manager for possessing skill is affected by both the internal structure of the firm and the presence of strong governance mechanisms. The internal structure of the firm not only affects the CEO's share in bargaining but also affects the manager's chances of becoming the CEO. The strength of governance affects the chances of a manager succeeding the CEO by bringing an outsider into the picture.
In the absence of strong governance mechanisms, the manager M1's expected payoff in a vertical firm is P V = R + ∆ V , as he is sure to succeed the current CEO. In a flat firm, he only succeeds the current CEO probabilistically. In equilibrium the manager's expected payoff in a horizontal firm is
In the presence of governance the insiders can become the CEO only if the incumbent CEO is not replaced by an outsider. The probability that the CEO is replaced depends on the internal organization. In a flat firm, the CEO is replaced with probability 1 − g(c, n * (δ = 1))
. Therefore, the expected payoff to each manager in the flat firm is now P
In a vertical firm, the CEO is replaced with probability 1 − g(c, 0) 2 (1 − L). The expected payoff to manager M1 in a vertical firm is now
Since the cost of acquiring skill for the manager is 1 2 k s s 2 , the level of skill she acquires in equilibrium is given by
Solving for the level of skill acquired in the various structures, I get
and s that the managers acquire. The optimal strength of governance is designed to balance these opposing effects. The optimal design would also enable an analysis of pay inequalities, since the pay inequality increases with greater information that is accompanied by flattening but reduces with lower skill acquired by managers.
A firm that is initially flat will have strong governance if
This simplifies to g(c, 0)
Similarly, a firm that is initially vertical will have strong governance if
Note that a firm that is initially vertical and remains vertical in the presence of strong governance has no restructuring benefits and only costs associated with lower managerial skill. Thus, the above two conditions are sufficient to characterize the joint design of governance and internal organization. We can now analyze the effect of information technology on the design of corporate governance. The following proposition summarizes the effect. Figure 4 shows the regions that characterize the four different structures that arise :
Proposition 4 Strong governance becomes more desirable and firms become flatter as the costs of acquiring information decrease.
(1) flat firms with weak governance, (2) vertical firms with weak governance, (3) flat firms with strong governance where governance is not accompanied by restructuring and (4) where governance is accompanied by restructuring.
Strong governance and flat structures are desirable as the lower level managers are more informed whereas weak governance and vertical structures are optimal when the managers are not highly informed. As the level of managerial information (g(c, 0)) increases, the costs of governance reduce because of the fact that better information provides the CEO with higher bargaining power and hence a higher reward to the managers on becoming the CEO. Further, as circumstances of being uninformed reduce, the probability of taking a wrong decision reduces. This leads to greater cases of natural succession.
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Therefore greater managerial information due to cheaper sources of information acquisition reduces the costs of strong governance through two channels. On the other hand, greater managerial information also increases the benefits of governance as it prevents greater losses due to either reduced access or counterproductive activities.
However, if losses associated with information transfer (L) are very low, then the benefits of governance are very low and there is little need to restructure the firm. Consequently, firms are likely to be vertical and have weak governance when informational losses in a vertical firm are low.
Finally, the optimal region would depend on not only the cost of acquiring information and the losses in information transmission but also the difficulty of acquiring firm specific skill. In firms, where firm specific skill is low, the counterproductive activities would also be lower. Consequently, the power struggle costs of having a flat firm reduce and hence the need for governance reduces. In such cases, the optimal design is more likely to be flat firms accompanied by weak governance.
We can now return to analyze the pay inequalities. The following proposition compares the pay inequalities between firms when both governance and internal organization are optimally designed. Proof: See Appendix.
Note that both among firms that are initially vertical and that are initially flat, the ones that now have strong governance are the ones where managerial information is relatively high.
This higher information not only makes a flat structure more desirable but is also associated with a higher pay inequality. The proposition above also shows that the internal organization of the firm will be associated with pay inequality in firms. Thus, internal organization might be a useful tool to differentiate between CEOs who are paying themselves too much and CEOs who are value maximizing.
Extensions and Discussion
Before proceeding to relate the framework to the empirical patterns, I discuss the robustness of the results to the following changes -1. CEO compensation is designed by shareholders to motivate lower-level managers rather than through a bargaining process, 2. managerial compensation is based on firm performance rather than cash and 3. governance increases the probability of an insider replacement rather than outsider replacement of the CEO. Finally, I proceed to extend the framework to consider the impact of product market competition and financial constraints on internal organization.
Tournaments and CEO compensation
A vast literature, following Lazear and Rosen (1981) , has viewed promotion as an incentive device. This section analyzes the sensitivity of the results if the CEO's pay was designed by the shareholders to motivate the lower-level managers, rather than through bargaining between the CEO and the shareholders. The losses in a vertical firm now arise endogenously . So far, in order to focus on power struggles, I assumed that the CEO bases his views on these counterproductive activities. It is now important that the level of managerial skill also play a role in this selection process. Let us therefore assume that, when managers compete, each manager is viewed favorably by the CEO with probability w s s + w n n and as earlier, if they are both viewed favorably by the CEO, they have an equal chance of becoming the CEO. w s can be viewed as the fraction of the skill that can be observed directly and w n the fraction that can be manipulated through counterproductive activities.
In a vertical firm, the lower-level manager faces no competition. Consequently, she neither acquires any additional skill nor does she expend effort in counterproductive activities.
Therefore, s * V = s 0 and n * V = 0. This is true irrespective of whether the firm is subject to strong or weak governance.
On the other hand, in a flat firm managers compete to become the CEO leading to productive skill acquisition activities and to counterproductive activities. In a firm without any governance, the managers maximization problem can be written as 
In a flat firm with strong governance, the shareholders maximization problem is
The first order condition for the case when governance is weak yields g(c, n *
For the case, when governance is strong the pay inequality can be increased to its maximum possible level.
We can now see that the results presented earlier remain unchanged. Consider the case when the firm is flat. First note that when governance is strong, the pay inequality is now increased to its maximum possible level because CEO pay can be increased without the fear of counterproductive activities. However, the likelihood of an outsider replacement [g(c, 0) 2 ] also reduces the level of skill acquired. Clearly, for low enough cost of information acquisition (high g(c, 0), the pay inequality in a flat firm with governance will lead to more skilled managers than in a flat firm with weak governance. In the absence of any counterproductive activities, this greater skill will also translate into a higher firm value. Thus as costs of acquiring information reduce, strong governance and flat structures are more likely to be optimal. I first address the use of performance based pay, an example of which is awarding shares in the firm. Clearly, such compensation packages will reduce counterproductive activities.
Performance based Pay
However, their scope in doing so will be limited as long as CEO pay is higher than managerial pay. Further, the framework suggests that if performance based pay is indeed used to partly address these concerns, managers in flat firms would have greater stock ownership and lower cash salaries than managers in vertical firms. This is consistent with evidence in Rajan and Wulf (2003) who document that salaries at low levels in flatter firms are lower than in comparable positions in a tall organization while managers in flatter firms have a higher ownership stake than their counterparts in vertical firms.
Another mechanism that has been suggested to control these activities is to reduce interference by superiors in making decisions that have little impact on firm value but that is important for the juniors (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988) . The choice of a future CEO is an important decision for the firm. Reducing incumbent CEO interference in this decision is difficult since the incumbent CEO is the one who is likely to have the most information on the CEO candidates. Consequently, this mechanism is less likely to be of use in the context of CEO succession.
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At the broad level of generality at which counterproductive activities are analyzed here, it is difficult to think of one mechanism that mitigates the costs associated with all these activities. I, however, note that governance only addresses residual counterproductive activities.
Insiders versus Outsiders
Governance, so far, has been characterized by two features -1. performance based 34 Yet another channel through which these counterproductive activities might have limited costs for the firm is if the CEO does not rely on information from the managers (Milgrom and Roberts (1986) . However given that all parties have information strong governance would allow a more decentralized decision making process.
dismissal that increase the likelihood of 2. outsider replacement (or conversely reduce the likelihood of insider succession). In this subsection, I discuss the optimal choice of CEO replacement in cases of forced dismissals.
If performance based CEO dismissals are accompanied by insider replacement rather than outsider replacement, the benefits of governance discussed earlier do not exist. Rather the counterproductive power struggle activities are now likely to increase. In these scenarios, the chance of an early promotion only increases the reward of becoming the CEO. Further, the cooperation between the CEO and the lower-level managers will also reduce since it is now in the manager's interest to get the CEO fired. Governance will not be associated with restructuring in such cases and the only source of value creation would be the value that arises from the replacement decision. Interestingly, given strong governance mechanisms with insider replacement, it might now be necessary to change the structure of an initially flat firm to vertical to mitigate the increased power struggles among lower-level managers.
Therefore, if a threat of performance based CEO dismissal were to be used, it is optimal for such a threat to be accompanied by a commitment to use an outsider.
Governance mechanisms such as hostile takeovers automatically satisfy these conditions.
Similarly bankruptcy and liquidation due to a large amount of debt would also generate similar results. Note however that other governance mechanisms such as a strong board of directors might not always satisfy the second condition.
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A large fraction of outside directors on the board might provide such a commitment. Similarly, the existence of CEO recruiting firms might provide the necessary threat.
Other forms of control Competition -The Contagion Effect Of Corporate Governance
Product market competition is often viewed as a mechanism that controls inefficient 35 Hermalin (2003) shows that a stronger board is associated with a greater chance of outsider replacement Corporate Governance and Internal Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 managerial activity (see e.g. Alchian (1950) , Stigler (1958 ), Hart(1983 ).
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The framework
here can be used to analyze two effects of competition. First, it supports the traditional view that competition in combination with debt can make firms efficient. Distress can cause CEO dismissal and hence have the same effect as shareholder induced dismissal. This suggests that competition and debt will be complements. Second and more closely related to the specific inefficiency analyzed here, the model provides a novel channel through which governance improvements in one firm can enable other similar firms in to restructure.
The essence of how governance interacts with competition is that the presence of strong governance (replacement of the CEO with a greater likelihood of outsider succession) increases the chances of top management managers to move within firms. This effect is likely to be stronger if the industry is characterized by homogenous firms (greater competition).
The greater number of interfirm transfers to a higher level now affects the incentives of managers in each firm since it creates new opportunities for them outside their own firm.
To see this in the framework presented here, assume that the manager can find a position as a CEO in another firm in its industry with probability, c. c will not only be a function of the number of similar firms but also the governance standards in those firms. For simplicity, I assume that the CEO pay in the other firm is equal to the CEO pay in the current firm.
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This is equivalent to assuming that the pay inequalities in the two firms are equal since all managers have the same reservation level. So, ∆ i F = ∆ j > 0 where i denotes the manager's current firm and j the manager's prospective firm. It is now possible to characterize the manager's effort in counterproductive in such an environment. To emphasize the effect of the industry's governance standards on a firm, assume that the firm in question has weak governance, i.e., no threat of CEO dismissal. If such a firm is flat, the managers will indulge 36 See Allen and Gale (2000) for a review. 37 All that is required for the result is that the CEO pay in the other firm is higher than the manager's pay in the current firm.
in counterproductive activities that is given by
where R = C M + wB is the reservation wage. Note that a manager only has incentives to indulge in counterproductive activities if he does not have an offer from outside the firm.
Solving for the optimal solution
Since c > 0, the counterproductive activities reduce thereby enabling the current firm to restructure as long as (1 −
. The following proposition summarizes this effect in partial equilibrium.
Proposition 6 In an industry with homogenous firms, strong governance in some firms may allow the CEOs of the weakly governed firms to flatten their firms.
This shows how even when a firm has poor governance, the improvement in governance standards in other similar firms can reduce managerial effort in counterproductive activities and enable flattening of the firm. This provides an explanation for 'voluntary' restructuring even when the firm has poor governance.
Financial Constraints
The framework presented here ignores control that shareholders can exercise through the financing channel. The implicit assumption was that financing was done at the beginning of the period for a profitable project. Let us now assume that the firm has weak governance mechanisms but is required to raise financing at the beginning of the period as well as at the intermediate stage when the CEO takes an action. Examples of such staged financing are common in venture capital backed firms (Sahlman (1990) ), where each round of financing is accompanied by the release of new information about the venture. In such a case,
Corporate Governance and Internal Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 nonproductive activities by the manager increase the chances that the project will be liquidated. This would be tantamount to a collective dismissal of the entire top management.
Therefore financial control can substitute for governance mechanisms and firms with greater financial constraints will be flatter. A complete analysis of how financing policy and cash policy interact with internal organization is beyond the scope of this paper and is undertaken elsewhere.
6 Empirical Implications
Explaining the trends
The paper has jointly designed corporate governance and the internal organization of firms to
show that flat firms and strong governance is optimal when managers can acquire information easily while vertical firms and weak governance is optimal when the costs of acquiring information are high (Proposition 4). Also, the pay inequality in firms with strong governance and flat structures is higher than in vertical firms and weak governance (Proposition 5).
While several factors have changed over the last two decades, these propositions shed light on the three trends -greater shareholder activism, flatter firms and higher pay inequality.
Changes over the last two decades in the means of acquiring information and the higher ability to process this information have contributed to a reduction in the costs of acquiring information. Specifically, developments in the field of information technology, which began in the late 70's, have lowered costs of acquiring and processing information.
38
A few examples of such changes are the development of expert systems, electronic detection devices and codification allowed by computers. Such changes, that have enabled lower-level managers to be more informed have increased the benefits and lowered the costs of strong governance mechanisms. Consequently the optimal structure has changed from vertical firms and flat governance to flat firms and strong governance. Accompanying this change is an increase in pay inequality. Therefore, developments in information technology endogenously give rise to the three aforementioned trends simultaneously.
The framework also suggests that governance not only enables firms to become flatter but also enables firms to become bigger, through the reduction of counterproductive activities associated with a greater number of lower-level managers. In addition it suggests that greater competition will enable firms to become flatter due to not only a greater threat of bankruptcy but also due to the 'contagion effect' through labor market movements. Several industries, such as Air Transport, Broadcasting, Entertainment, Natural Gas, Trucking and Transport Leasing experienced major federal deregulation in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) ). Such changes not only removed artificial barriers to firm size but also increased entry by new firms. Thus, the framework suggests that these expansion opportunities increase the beneficiary role of strong governance. It also suggests that greater competition will increase external control if firms have a significant fraction of debt. Both these changes would be accompanied by flatter firms and greater pay inequality.
Therefore deregulation plays an important role in generating the three trends.
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The increase in the number of firms operating in an industry due to deregulation might also explain why firms restructure even in the absence of a direct threat (Proposition 6).
Consistent with this Kaplan and Holmstrom (2001) note that "nearly half of all major U.S.
corporations received a takeover offer in the 1980s-and many companies that were not taken over responded to hostile pressure with internal restructuring that made themselves less attractive targets." Further, this paper suggests that such cases of 'voluntary' restructuring will be higher when the industry is characterized by homogenous firms.
Two other papers shed light on two of these trends -flatter firms and higher pay inequality in the top management. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg(2003) investigates how developments in information technology influence firm organization in the absence of incentive problems.
He shows that the if information technology has primarily lead to a reduction in the costs of acquiring information, one could use information technology to justify the two trends of flatter firms and greater pay inequality. The framework presented here shows that power struggles can force a firm to deviate from its first best structure and that strong governance can enable the firm to return to the optimal structure. Interestingly, as in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2003) , one of the factors that makes governance optimal and firms flatter is lower costs of acquiring information. Therefore, the effect pointed out in this paper reinforces the effect that the first best structure is also flatter with higher pay inequality.
Consequently, introducing incentive problems reinforces the two trends that accompany the first best structure and also generates the third observed trend of greater shareholder activism.
One could also appeal to Zingales (1998, 2001) to explain the two trends of flatter firms and higher top management pay inequality. As expropriation opportunities increase, either due to greater access to capital or due to the human capital intensive nature of work, it is now optimal to have flatter firms. Flatter firms reduce the positional power that lower level agents have and hence reduce the chances that they walk away from the firm with their juniors. However, in order to make them specialize now, it is also important that they be given a prize -future ownership. Thus firms will be flatter and pay inequality higher as expropriation by managers is a bigger concern. A contribution of this paper to highlight the friction that is associated with the choice of future head, an issue not considered in Zingales (1998, 2001) . As with Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2003) , introducing this effect not only reinforces the two outlined trends but also generates a role for greater shareholder activism.
In sum then, exogenous patterns in information technology and deregulation worked towards strengthening corporate governance, with the accompanying trends of flattening firms and higher pay inequality. 
Other Implications
Prior clinical work, such as Baker and Wruck (1990) and Wruck (1994) , documents a connection between value creation and the nature of a firm's governance structure, organizational design, and compensation systems. Kaplan, Mitchell and Wruck (2000) identify organizational changes as a key factor contributing to the success (or failure) of a merger. These papers show that there is a link between external finance and the internal organization of the firm -that is made clear by concomitant financial and organizational restructuring.
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The framework presented here provides a theoretical justification for this link. It also generates several cross sectional implications that I list here in three categories. Since the loss of information in vertical firms (L) is more likely in industries where the nature of information is soft, I use soft and hard information to characterize the relative magnitude of these losses.
A. Governance, Restructuring and Pay Inequality
A.1 Governance Induced Restructuring
Governance induced restructuring activity is more likely to occur in industries where informational losses are relatively low and where managers have a high amount of information.
Further, the contagion effect of competition discussed in section 5 implies that there will be a greater number of indirect governance induced restructuring in industries with a greater number of homogenous firms. Finally, governance induced restructuring is more likely as human capital is more specialized to firm assets. This suggests that governance induced restructuring activity is more likely in firms that operate in hard information, low uncertainty and competitive environments and where firm specific skill is important.
A.2 Pay Inequality
In the context of the framework, the pay inequality depends on the level of information that the CEO receives and the firm specific skill. The information that the CEO receives is 40 For a description of recent trends in corporate organization see Holmstrom and Kaplan(2001 Rajan and Wulf (2003) find that pay inequality is higher when the number of managers reporting to the CEO is greater. Since managers are also more likely to be informed in low uncertainty environments, pay inequality is likely to be higher in firms operating in low uncertainty conditions. The CEO's ability to access information is also higher with governance, as governance reduces counterproductive activities enhancing the amount of information produced by managers (Proposition 1). Thus, pay inequality also increases with stronger governance.
A.3 Governance and Internal Organization
The paper argues that both governance and internal organization are endogenously determined. Therefore empirical tests that relate governance to firm flatness will only imply a correlation. Further, this relation might be sensitive to the sample analyzed since the relation is non monotonic.
B. CEO Succession
A precondition for forced turnovers is the presence of strong governance mechanisms.
While the framework suggests that strong governance mechanisms are more likely to be accompanied by flat firms, it is not clear if forced dismissals are higher in flat firms. The threat of dismissal is less likely to be exercised in flat firms relative to vertical firms. Therefore, a regression relating the probability of CEO dismissal (p(dismissal)) to governance (δ) and firm flatness (F ) would be of the form
where α 1 > 0 and α 2 < 0.
Given forced dismissals however, the framework suggests that an outsider replacement is more likely if the firm is flat and insider replacement is more likely when the firm is vertical. Section 5 briefly discusses the impact of alternative control mechanisms to correct for managerial inefficiencies. The discussion suggests that firms in competitive environments with a high level of debt and firms that are financially constrained are more likely to be flat.
C. Other forms of control
In the context of venture backed firms discussed earlier, this suggests that firms that are venture capital backed will be flatter.
D. Labor Market Mobility
Labor market mobility can reduce intra-firm career concerns of top management managers by creating opportunities for pursuing career opportunities in different firms -thus leading to lesser power struggles and hence greater degree of firm flatness. This suggests that economies where labor markets are mobile will be characterized by flatter firms and that firms in homogenous industries are more likely to be flat.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the joint design of corporate governance and internal organization of firms. In the model presented here, internal organization plays two roles. Internal organization determines not only the access that managers have to headquarters but also the CEO's access to managers. Greater access to managers enables the CEO to receive greater information while greater access to headquarters allows the managers to accumulate skills that are required to be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). If selected as the future CEO, this gives them power to bargain with the shareholders (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . However, the selection process involves intra-firm managerial competition ('power struggles') that results in not only productive activities but also in counterproductive power struggles.
Strong governance mechanisms are characterized by performance based CEO dismissal.
It is shown that such dismissals are more likely to use outsider replacement of the CEO to 'empower' many managers. However, the chance of an outsider replacement also reduces manager's incentives to acquire skill. Governance and internal organization is optimally designed to balance these effects.
The framework jointly explains three trends that have characterized the American economy over the last two decades -greater shareholder induced CEO turnover, flattening firms and steeper pay differentials in organizations. This paper presents a theoretical step in explaining why external control and internal organization are related. I focus on control exercised through the dismissal mechanism. A more complete version of such a theory promises to generate implications on how the internal organization of a firm is linked to the financing decisions and cash policy of the firm.
Proposition 2
Value of a firm that is flat increases due to strong governance by the elimination of managerial counterproductive activities. Therefore the value increases by σXg(c, 0) Case when rival appears with probability r < 1
The effect of governance on the tradeoff between information acquisition and managerial power struggles was emphasized earlier using sure dismissal (r = 1) in case of poor performance. This resulted in managers completely abstaining from any counterproductive activities (n = 0). Clearly, it may not be possible to replace the CEO under all cases of poor performance. A simple way to capture this is to assume that the rival appears with probability r < 1. In order to obtain closed form solutions, I use the functional form, 
Figure 4 Optimal Firm structures and Corporate Governance
The figure shows how the optimal firm structure (flat or vertical) and the optimal strength of the corporate governance mechanisms (weak or strong) change as managerial information increases (c denotes the cost of acquiring information and g(c, 0) the maximum possible information with the lower level managers) and nature of information (higher L denotes greater losses due to reduced access) changes.
